ODLUKA Evropski sud za ljudska prava po predstavci broj 27905/24, Petrović protiv Srbije

TREĆE ODELJENJE

ODLUKA

Predstavka broj 27905/24

Vesna PETROVIĆ

protiv Srbije

Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Treće odeljenje), na zasedanju Odbora 8. septembra 2026. godine u sastavu:

Peeter Roosma, predsednik,

Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,

Mateja Đurović, sudije,

i Olga Chernishova, zamenica sekretara Odeljenja,

Imajući u vidu:

predstavku (broj 27905/24) protiv Republike Srbije koju je 20. septembra 2024. godine, prema članu 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: „Konvencija”), Sudu podnela državljanka Srbije, gospođa Vesna Petrović (u daljem tekstu: „podnositeljka”), rođena 1955. godine i koja živi u Nišu, a koju je zastupao gospodin Aleksić, advokat iz istog grada;

odluku da se o pritužbi u vezi sa članom 1. Protokola broj 1 uz Konvenciju obavesti Vlada Srbije (u daljem tekstu: „Vlada”), koju zastupa njena zastupnica, gospođa Z. Jadrijević Mladar, i da se ostatak predstavke proglasi nedopuštenim;

Zapažanja strana u sporu;

odluku da odbaci prigovor Vlade na razmatranje predstavke od strane Veća;

Nakon većanja, odlučuje kako sledi:

OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA

1. Predstavka se odnosi na navodnu povredu prava podnositeljke na mirno uživanje njene imovine.

2. Odlukom javnog beležnika od 8. marta 2019. godine, podnositeljka je od svoje pokojne majke nasledila, pored ostale imovine, pištolj (u daljem tekstu: „vatreno oružje”). Kako nije posedovala dozvolu za držanje/posedovanje oružja, podnositeljka je 14. marta 2019. godine predala oružje, zajedno sa pripadajućim okvirima i drugim povezanim predmetima, lokalnoj policijskoj stanici, koja joj je izdala potvrdu o privremeno oduzetim predmetima. Sutradan je podnela zahtev nadležnoj policijskoj upravi za izdavanje dozvole za držanje/posedovanje oružja.

3. Odlukom od 15. jula 2019. godine, donetoj na osnovu Zakona o oružju i municiji, policijska uprava je odbila zahtev podnositeljke, utvrdivši da ona nije dokazala postojanje opravdanih razloga za posedovanje vatrenog oružja radi lične bezbednosti, s obzirom na to da nije utvrdila da bi njena lična bezbednost mogla biti ugrožena. Istom odlukom, vatreno oružje je formalno oduzeto na osnovu člana 28. navedenog zakona, kojim je propisano da lice od koga je oružje oduzeto može isto otuđiti ili onesposobiti u roku od godinu dana od dana pravnosnažnosti rešenja o oduzimanju oružja, a ukoliko to ne učini, oružje postaje vlasništvo Republike Srbije. Shodno tome, podnositeljki je naloženo da, u roku od godinu dana od dana kada je odluka od 15. jula 2019. godine postala pravnosnažna, ili proda vatreno oružje ili ga učini trajno onesposobljenim, uz upozorenje da će u suprotnom pravo svojine na vatrenom oružju preći na državu.

4. Podnositeljka je uložila žalbu, navodeći da ima opravdane razloge za posedovanje vatrenog oružja radi lične bezbednosti, da ispunjava sve zakonske uslove za izdavanje dozvole za držanje/posedovanje oružja, kao i da predmetno oružje ima značajnu sentimentalnu vrednost kao deo zaostavštine njene pokojne majke. Konkretno, podnositeljka je navela da je vatreno oružje nasledila od svoje pokojne majke, da je završila sertifikovanu obuku za rukovanje vatrenim oružjem, da poseduje neophodno lekarsko uverenje, te da se kao žena koja živi sama oseća ugroženo, budući da su žene koje žive same izloženije riziku da postanu žrtve krivičnih dela, i da joj je stoga vatreno oružje potrebno radi lične zaštite. Pored toga, podnositeljka je ukazala na to da je odluka bila suštinski kontradiktorna, budući da je njome istovremeno naloženo oduzimanje vatrenog oružja i njoj naloženo da isto proda ili onesposobi, iako se ono više nije nalazilo u njenom posedu s obzirom na to da ga je policija već oduzela.

5. Drugostepeni organ je 2. septembra 2019. godine odbio žalbu podnositeljke, čime je prvostepena odluka postala konačna.

6. Podnositeljka je zatim podnela tužbu Upravnom sudu. U svojim podnescima tom sudu ponovila je argumente zbog čega joj treba izdati dozvolu za držanje/posedovanje oružja; međutim, ona nije ponovila niti na drugi način iznela argument da je odluka o oduzimanju bila suštinski kontradiktorna, budući da joj je istom bilo naloženo da proda ili onesposobi vatreno oružje koje više nije bilo u njenom posedu.

7. Upravni sud je 21. februara 2022. godine odbio njenu tužbu.

8. Podnositeljka je zatim podnela ustavnu žalbu, navodeći povrede svog ustavnog prava na pravično suđenje, prava svojine i prava na nasleđivanje.

9. Ustavni sud je dana 14. maja 2024. godine odbacio ustavnu žalbu podnositeljke. Ova odluka je uručena podnositeljki 9. jula 2024. godine.

10. Pozivajući se na član 1. Protokola broj 1 uz Konvenciju, podnositeljka se prituživala da je proizvoljno lišena sopstvene imovine.

OCENA SUDA

11. Vlada je iznela svoj stav da je predstavka nedopuštena, s obzirom na to da podnositeljka nije pretrpela značajniju štetu u smislu člana 35. stav 3. (b). Ona se posebno pozivala na nisku tržišnu vrednost vatrenog oružja (približno EUR 85), kao i na činjenicu da je podnositeljka mogla da se istog reši bez finansijskog gubitka. Dalje je tvrdila da je mešanje bilo zakonito, da je težilo ostvarivanju legitimnog cilja očuvanja javne bezbednosti i kontrole naoružanja, kao i da je bilo srazmerno, imajući u vidu široko polje slobodne procene u ovoj oblasti i mogućnost da je podnositeljka mogla da zadrži vatreno oružje u deaktiviranom obliku.

12. Podnositeljka je osporila prigovor Vlade i ostala pri svojim navodima. Tvrdila je da oduzimanje vatrenog oružja i obaveza da isto proda, onesposobi ili prenese pravo svojine nad njim na državu predstavljaju nesrazmerno mešanje u njena imovinska prava. Ona je istakla sentimentalnu vrednost vatrenog oružja kao nasledstva od njene pokojne majke i iznela stav da se, u datim okolnostima, šteta koju je pretrpela ne može smatrati zanemarljivom.

13. Sud ne smatra neophodnim da ispita prigovore Vlade jer je predstavka u svakom slučaju nedopuštena iz razloga koji su navedeni u nastavku.

14. Opšta načela koja se odnose na mešanje u pravo na mirno uživanje imovine sumirana su u predmetu Beyeler protiv Italije ([VV], broj 33202/96, st. 98. i 107, ESLJP 2000-I), G.I.E.M. S.r.l. i dr. protiv Italije ([VV], broj 1828/06 i 2 druge predstavke, st. 289–303, od 28. juna 2018. godine) i, u kontekstu mera koje se odnose na sprovođenje propisa o posedovanju vatrenog oružja, Waldemar Nowakowski protiv Poljske, (broj 55167/11, st. 44–50, od 24. jula 2012. godine).

15. Nije bilo sporno između stranaka da je oduzimanje vatrenog oružja podnositeljke predstavljalo mešanje u mirno uživanje njene imovine, da je bilo zakonito budući da je izvršeno direktnom primenom zakonske zabrane posedovanja vatrenog oružja bez dozvole, i da je težilo opštem interesu – naime, kontroli nad posedovanjem vatrenog oružja i zaštiti javne bezbednosti. Sud ne vidi razlog da smatra drugačije.

16. Sud ne smatra neophodnim da utvrdi da li je mešanje predstavljalo lišavanje imovine, u smislu druge rečenice prvog stava člana 1. Protokola broj 1, ili kontrolu korišćenja imovine u smislu drugog stava te odredbe, s obzirom na to da su načela koja se odnose na pitanje opravdanosti u suštini ista (videti Denisova i Moiseyeva protiv Rusije, broj 16903/03, stav 55, od 1. aprila 2010. godine, i Aktiva DOO protiv Srbije, broj 23079/11, stav 78, od 19. januara 2021. godine).

17. Jedino pitanje pred Sudom je, dakle, da li je mešanje postiglo pravičnu ravnotežu između zahteva opšteg interesa zajednice i zahteva zaštite prava podnositeljke, uzimajući u obzir, između ostalih faktora, ponašanje vlasnice vatrenog oružja (videti G.I.E.M. S.r.l. i dr., citiran gore, stav 293, i AGOSI protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, od 24. oktobra 1986. godine, st. 52. i 54, Serija A br. 108). Prilikom odabira mera koje smatraju odgovarajućim kako bi osigurale da vatreno oružje ne ostane u posedu lica koja nisu ovlašćena da isto drže, što je oblast u kojoj su u pitanju interesi javne bezbednosti, države ugovornice uživaju široko polje slobodne procene (videti, mutatis mutandis, predmet AGOSI, citiran gore, stav 52, i Denimark Limited i 11 dr. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (odl.), broj 37660/97, od 26. septembra 2000. godine).

18. Prelazeći na okolnosti predmetnog slučaja, Sud primećuje da je podnositeljka dobrovoljno predala vatreno oružje policiji nakon što je isto dobila na osnovu rešenja o nasleđivanju, i to u trenutku kada nije posedovala dozvolu za njegovo držanje/posedovanje (videti stav 2. gore). U tim okolnostima, nadležni organi nisu imali diskreciono pravo da ostave vatreno oružje u njenom posedu, a njegovo oduzimanje je usledilo neposredno i predvidivo kao posledica njenog sopstvenog saopštavanja informacija, a ne nekog proizvoljnog ili nepredvidivog postupka države.

19. Sud dalje konstatuje da osporena mera nije izrečena podnositeljki bez pružanja alternativa. U skladu sa članom 28. Zakona o oružju i municiji, lice od koga je oružje oduzeto može isto otuđiti ili onesposobiti u roku od godinu dana od dana pravnosnažnosti rešenja o oduzimanju oružja; u suprotnom, pravo svojine nad oružjem prelazi na državu (videti stav 3. gore).

20. U svojoj žalbi na prvostepenu odluku, podnositeljka je tvrdila da je izreka odluke o oduzimanju bila suštinski kontradiktorna, jer je od nje zahtevala da otuđi vatreno oružje koje više nije bilo u njenom posedu (videti stav 4. gore, in fine). Međutim, ona taj argument nije iznela pred Upravnim sudom, kao ni pred Ustavnim sudom niti u svojoj predstavci podnetoj Sudu. Čak i pod pretpostavkom da se taj argument može smatrati prećutno iznetim pred Sudom, i da su u tom pogledu i domaća pravna sredstva bila pravilno iscrpljena, Sud isti ne prihvata iz dva razloga. Kao prvo, član 28. Zakona o oružju i municiji, prema sopstvenim odredbama, pretpostavlja da mogućnosti prodaje vatrenog oružja ili njegovog onesposobljavanja ostaju otvorene čak i nakon njegovog oduzimanja; stoga taj sistem na prvi pogled nije suštinski kontradiktoran. Drugo, od tri mogućnosti koje su joj bile na raspolaganju prema domaćem pravu – naime, podnošenje zahteva za izdavanje dozvole za držanje/posedovanje vatrenog oružja, prodaja vatrenog oružja ili njegovo onesposobljavanje – podnositeljka je iskoristila samo prvu, pri čemu je taj zahtev na kraju odbijen nakon razmatranja pred organima na dva nivoa nadležnosti. Preostale dve alternativne mogućnosti su joj bile na raspolaganju tokom perioda od godinu dana od dana kada je odluka o oduzimanju vatrenog oružja postala konačna; ipak, ona nije tvrdila ni pred domaćim organima, ni pred Sudom da se u bilo kom trenutku obratila nadležnoj policijskoj upravi sa zahtevom da se bilo koja od te dve alternativne mogućnosti sprovede, niti da je prilikom takvog pokušaja naišla na bilo kakvu prepreku; takođe, u spisu predmeta ne postoji ništa što bi na to ukazivalo. S obzirom na to da nije pokušala da ispita da li su joj navedene alternativne mogućnosti u praksi bile dostupne, podnositeljki nije dozvoljeno da tvrdi da one ne bi bile dostupne samo na osnovu spekulacija.

21. Sud takođe konstatuje da je podnositeljka mogla da ospori odbijanje izdavanja dozvole za držanje/posedovanje vatrenog oružja i oduzimanje vatrenog oružja pred nadležnim drugostepenim organom (videti st. 4–5 gore), Upravnim sudom (videti st. 6–7 gore) i, naknadno, Ustavnim sudom (videti st. 8–9 gore), pri čemu je svaki od njih razmotrio njene navode i doneo obrazložene odluke. Stoga joj je pružena razumna prilika da iznese svoj slučaj pred nadležnim organima (videti G.I.E.M. S.r.l. i dr., citiran gore, stav 302.).

22. Imajući u vidu gorenavedeno, kao i zakonitost i predvidivost oduzimanja, široko polje slobodne procene koju uživaju države ugovornice u pogledu kontrole vatrenog oružja, stvarne alternative koje su podnositeljki bile na raspolaganju prema domaćem pravu, a koje ona nije ni pokušala da iskoristi, te mogućnosti koje su joj bile pružene da ospori tu meru pred domaćim organima, Sud smatra da osporeno mešanje nije narušilo pravičnu ravnotežu koja se zahteva članom 1. Protokola broj 1 uz Konvenciju, niti je podnositeljki nametnulo pojedinačni i prekomerni teret.

23. Shodno tome, predstavka se mora smatrati očigledno neosnovanom, te se mora odbaciti u skladu sa članom 35. st. 3. (a) i 4. Konvencije.

IZ OVIH RAZLOGA, SUD, JEDNOGLASNO,

Proglašava predstavku nedopuštenom.

Sastavljeno na engleskom jeziku i prosleđeno u pisanom obliku 1. oktobra 2026. godine.

Olga Chernishova

Zamenica Sekretara

Peeter Roosma

Predsednik

THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 27905/24Vesna PETROVIĆagainst Serbia

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 8 September 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Peeter Roosma, President,

Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,

Mateja Đurović, judges,

and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 27905/24) against Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 September 2024 by a Serbian national, Ms Vesna Petrović (“the applicant”), who was born in 1955 and lives in Niš, and was represented by Mr Aleksić, a lawyer practising in the same city;

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to the Serbian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

the decision to dismiss the Government’s objection to examination of the application by a Committee;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The application concerns an alleged violation of the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.

2. By a decision of a public notary of 8 March 2019, the applicant inherited, among other assets, a pistol (hereinafter “the firearm”) from her late mother. As she did not hold a firearm licence, on 14 March 2019 the applicant surrendered the firearm, together with its accompanying magazines and other related items, to the local police station, which issued her a certificate confirming that these items had been temporarily seized (potvrda o privremeno oduzetim predmetima). On the following day, she applied to the competent police department for the issuance of a firearm licence.

3. By a decision of 15 July 2019, adopted on the basis of the Firearms and Ammunition Act (Zakon o oružju i municiji), the police department rejected the applicant’s request, finding that she had failed to demonstrate justified grounds for possessing a firearm for personal security, as she had not established that her personal safety was liable to be endangered. By the same decision, the firearm was formally seized under Article 28 of that Act, which provides that a person from whom a firearm has been seized may alienate it or have it rendered inoperable within one year of the date on which the decision ordering the seizure becomes final, failing which the firearm becomes the property of the Republic of Serbia. The applicant was accordingly ordered, within one year of the date on which the decision of 15 July 2019 became final, to either sell the firearm or have it rendered permanently inoperable, failing which ownership of the firearm would pass to the State.

4. The applicant appealed, arguing that she had justified grounds for possessing the firearm for her personal security, that she satisfied all the statutory requirements for the issuance of a firearm licence and that the firearm had considerable sentimental value as part of her late mother’s estate. Specifically, the applicant submitted that she had inherited the firearm from her late mother, that she had completed certified training in the handling of firearms, that she held the necessary medical certificate, and that, being a woman living alone, she felt vulnerable, as women living alone were more likely to be victims of crime, and that she accordingly needed a firearm for her personal protection. In addition, the applicant pointed out that the decision was inherently contradictory, as it had simultaneously ordered the seizure of the firearm and ordered her to sell it or render it inoperable, even though it was no longer in her possession, it having been seized by the police.

5. On 2 September 2019 the second-instance authority dismissed the applicant’s appeal, thereby rendering the first-instance decision final.

6. The applicant subsequently lodged a claim before the Administrative Court. In her submissions before that court, she reiterated her arguments as to why she ought to have been issued a firearm licence; she did not reiterate or otherwise raise her argument that the confiscation decision had been inherently contradictory in that it had ordered her to sell or render inoperable a firearm no longer in her possession.

7. On 21 February 2022 the Administrative Court dismissed her claim.

8. The applicant then lodged a constitutional appeal, alleging violations of her constitutional right to a fair trial, right of property and right to inheritance.

9. On 14 May 2024 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional appeal. Its decision was served on the applicant on 9 July 2024.

10. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complained that she had been arbitrarily deprived of her possessions.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

11. The Government submitted that the application was inadmissible, as the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b). They relied in particular on the firearm’s low market value (approximately 85 euros) and on the fact that the applicant could have disposed of it without financial loss. They further argued that the interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of public safety and arms control and had been proportionate, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation in this field and to the possibility that the applicant could have kept the firearm in a deactivated form.

12. The applicant contested the Government’s objection and maintained her complaints. She argued that the confiscation of the firearm and the obligation either to sell it, render it inoperable or transfer its ownership to the State amounted to a disproportionate interference with her property rights. She stressed the sentimental value of the firearm as an inheritance from her late mother and argued that, in these circumstances, the disadvantage she had suffered could not be considered insignificant.

13. The Court does not find it necessary to examine all of the objections raised by the Government, as the application is, in any event, inadmissible for the reasons set out below.

14. The general principles concerning interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions have been summarised in Beyeler v. Italy ([GC], no. 33202/96, §§ 98 and 107, ECHR 2000-I), G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy ([GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, §§ 289-303, 28 June 2018) and, in the context of measures concerning the enforcement of legislation governing the possession of firearms, Waldemar Nowakowski v. Poland, (no. 55167/11, §§ 44-50, 24 July 2012).

15. It has not been in dispute between the parties that the seizure of the applicant’s firearm constituted an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, that it was lawful, having been carried out in direct application of the statutory prohibition on the possession of firearms without a licence, and that it pursued the general interest, namely control over the possession of firearms and the protection of public safety. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.

16. The Court does not find it necessary to determine whether the interference amounted to a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 or to a control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of that provision, as the principles governing the question of justification are substantially the same (see Denisova and Moiseyeva v. Russia, no. 16903/03, § 55, 1 April 2010, and Aktiva DOO v. Serbia, no. 23079/11, § 78, 19 January 2021).

17. The sole question before the Court is accordingly whether the interference struck a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the applicant’s rights, regard being had, among other factors, to the conduct of the owner (see G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others, cited above, § 293, and AGOSI v. the United Kingdom, 24 October 1986, §§ 52 and 54, Series A no. 108). In choosing the measures they consider appropriate for ensuring that firearms do not remain in the possession of persons not authorised to hold them, a sphere in which considerations of public safety are directly at stake, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (see, mutatis mutandis, AGOSI, cited above, § 52, and Denimark Limited and 11 Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 37660/97, 26 September 2000).

18. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant voluntarily surrendered the firearm to the police, upon receiving it under the inheritance decision, at a time when she held no licence for its possession (see paragraph 2 above). In these circumstances, the authorities had no discretion to leave the firearm in her possession, and its confiscation followed directly and foreseeably from her own disclosure rather than from any arbitrary or unforeseeable act on the part of the State.

19. The Court further notes that the impugned measure was not imposed on the applicant without alternatives. Under Article 28 of the Firearms and Ammunition Act, a person whose firearm has been confiscated may alienate it or have it rendered inoperable within one year of the date on which the confiscation decision becomes final; failing that, ownership of the firearm passes to the State (see paragraph 3 above).

20. In her appeal against the first-instance decision, the applicant argued that the operative part of the confiscation decision was inherently contradictory, in that it required her to dispose of a firearm no longer in her possession (see paragraph 4 in fine above). She did not, however, advance this argument before the Administrative Court, before the Constitutional Court or in her application before the Court. Even assuming that the argument may be understood to have been implicitly raised before the Court, and that domestic remedies had also been properly exhausted in that respect, the Court is not persuaded by it for two reasons. First, Article 28 of the Firearms and Ammunition Act, under its own terms, presupposes that the possibilities of selling a firearm or having it rendered inoperable remain open even after its seizure; the scheme is not, therefore, self-contradictory on its face. Second, of the three avenues available to her under domestic law, that is, applying for a licence, selling the firearm, or having it rendered inoperable, the applicant pursued only the first, which was ultimately refused following an assessment at two levels of jurisdiction. The remaining two alternatives were available to her for a period of one year from the date on which the confiscation decision became final, yet she did not claim, either domestically or before the Court, that she had at any point approached the competent police department to request that either of them be executed or that she had encountered any obstacle in doing so; nor is there anything in the file to suggest as much. Having made no attempt to test whether these alternatives were in practice available to her, it is not open to the applicant to argue, on the basis of speculation alone, that they would not have been.

21. The Court also notes that the applicant was able to challenge both the refusal of a licence and the confiscation of the firearm before the competent second-instance authority (see paragraphs 4-5 above), the Administrative Court (see paragraphs 6-7 above) and, subsequently, the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 8-9 above), each of which examined her arguments and gave reasoned decisions. She was therefore afforded a reasonable opportunity of putting her case to the responsible authorities (see G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others, cited above, § 302).

22. Having regard to the foregoing, the lawful and foreseeable character of the confiscation, the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States in matters concerning the control of firearms, the genuine alternatives available to the applicant under domestic law of which she made no attempt to avail herself, and the opportunities afforded to her to contest the measure before the domestic authorities, the Court considers that the interference complained of did not upset the fair balance required by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, nor did it impose an individual and excessive burden on the applicant.

23. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 1 October 2026.

Olga Chernishova

Deputy Registar

Peeter Roosma

President